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Abstract
Australia's bushfire seasons are
expected to become longer and
more severe due to the effects of
climate change and an increasing
population living in rural-urban
fringes. Social and economic
vulnerability to extreme natural
hazards means that Australia’s
emergency services sector plays
a significant role in community
safety and wellbeing. Therefore,
it is important that the sector
continually improves. Australia
has a long history of conducting
external reviews into significant
bushfires. While these reviews
receive good support and seek to
identify relevant lessons, barriers
remain that prevent these lessons
from being effectively learnt. It is
possible that some of these barriers
exist because the stratum of work
impedes the capture, codifying
and adjustments to systems.
This research investigated the
premise that lessons learnt in the
Australian emergency services
sector occurs on a stratum, with
different types of lessons learnt
at different levels of work. Four
significant independent bushfire
reviews were analysed to evaluate
whether specific lessons could
be aligned to the stratum of
work. Findings were that not
all lessons apply to all levels of
organisations. This supports the
premise that lessons are learnt on
a vertical organisational stratum;
for example, some lessons were
operational, others were tactical
and some were strategic. It
was determined that a lack of
understanding of the barriers
within an organisations stratum
could impede the effectiveness of
lessons being learnt.
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Introduction
Australia’s bushfire seasons are lasting longer and getting
more severe. More Australians are living in rural-urban fringe
areas and Australia’s climate has changed with increasing
temperatures (CSIRO & Bureau of Meteorology 2018). These
circumstances present challenges for the emergency services
sector, which includes multiple organisations (each with
several organisational strata) operating in a high stress, highconsequence environment. The emergency services sector
needs to be continually improving, which requires effective
lessons learnt processes to prevent, prepare, respond to and
recover from bushfires.
External inquiries are conducted after significant disasters,
especially bushfires (Dufty 2013; Owen et al. 2018).
According to Eburn and Dovers (2015, p.501) ‘between
1939 and 2010 Royal Commissions and other inquiries have
produced 953 recommendations as lessons to reduce the
risk of bushfire’. Such reviews are conducted by experts,
have clear terms of reference and state the methodology,
which includes consultation with experts and/or affected
community members. For example, both the Margaret
River bushfire review (Keelty 2012) and the Bega Valley Fires
Independent Review (Keelty 2018) were authored by Michael
Joseph Keelty AO APM, a former Commissioner of the
Australian Federal Police. Other reviews, such as the review
into the 2009 Victorian bushfires (Teague, McLeod & Pascoe
2010), are conducted as royal commissions, which carries
significant weight (Australian Law Reform Commission 2010).
Nevertheless, questions arise regarding whether the
recommendations identified in reviews are actually
converted to lessons, or even learnt by the emergency
services sector and the Australian community (Dufty 2013,
Owen et al. 2018) and integrated into capability. Reasons
for such criticism include limited follow-up after the event
and whether lessons can be transferred between events
(Eburn & Dovers 2015). There is also no existing standard for
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conducting external reviews (Cole et al. 2018, Dufty 2013, Owen
et al. 2018) and variances exist in codifying and communicating
lessons learnt.
Noting the literature limitations, this study considered the
research question: ‘Do the lessons identified in prior significant
incidents support the proposition that lessons are learnt at
different stratum of the organisation?’

Learning in the emergency services
sector
There is an extensive body of knowledge about emergency
services, emergency management and disaster management
(Howes et al. 2015; Owen et al. 2018; Whitmer, LaGoy & Sims
2018; Glassey 2015). This literature covers the 4 stages of the
emergency management cycle being prevention, preparedness,
response and recovery. There is a significant emphasis on future
risk factors such as the effects of climate change (McAneney,
Chen & Pitman 2009; McCaw 2013; Winkworth et al. 2009).
A subset of the literature focuses on significant Australian
bushfires, especially the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires and the
2009 Victorian bushfires (Cameron et al. 2009, Leonard & Howitt
2010, Valent 1984).

How organisations learn
Organisations adapt and learn and this results in tangible and
intangible benefits (Deverell 2009 Duffield & Whitty 2015,
Rowe & Sikes 2006). However, the structure of an organisation
can affect its ability to learn (Aubry & Lavoie-Tremblay 2018).
This supports the work of Garvin, Edmondson and Gino (2008),
who argue that concrete learning processes and leadership
that reinforces learning are important factors in establishing a
learning organisation. This is particularly relevant for emergency
services organisations that are ‘traditionally hierarchical in nature
and tend to value their own command and control arrangements’
(Owen et al. 2018, p.716). For example, Boin and t'Hart (2010)
argue that there are different challenges at the operational and
strategic level in emergency services organisations.

Gaps in emergency services learning
There is a large body of knowledge about identifying and learning
lessons, also known as lessons management, in emergency
management (Cole et al. 2018, Jackson 2016, Stuart & Thomason
2018, Donahue & Tuohy 2006). A review of this work showed
some dissent in organisational learning literature regarding the
use of the terms ‘lessons learnt’ and ‘lessons management’.
However, the definition differences of these terms are outside
the scope of this paper. Within the Australian context, a seminal
text is the Lessons Management Handbook (Australian Institute
for Disaster Resilience 2019), which includes a 4-step cycle for
managing lessons. These are:
·

collection

·

analysis

·

implementation

·

monitoring and review.

As Owen and co-authors (2018) argue, this body of knowledge is
growing, stating that:

a search of one database, for example (Proquest) revealed
that of the 266 publications identified using the search
terms learning lessons and emergency management 50 per
cent of them had been published in the past five years.
(Owen et al. 2018, p.716).
Cole and co-authors (2018, p.34) conducted a meta-analysis of
‘1,336 recommendations made in 55 Australian major postevent reviews and inquiries since 2009’. Although this research
identified common themes across the post-event reviews,
these themes were not aligned to specific organisational strata
and failed to consider Boin and t'Hart's (2010) views about the
challenges for learning lessons at different levels in emergency
services organisations. This limitation indicates that a gap in the
literature exists. Although literature about Stratified Systems
Theory, organisational learning and learning in the emergency
services sector already exists, to date, these have not been fused
to investigate the lessons-learnt process in different strata in
emergency services organisations.

Underlying theory
The idea of different strata existing within an organisation
containing different roles, responsibilities and outlook based
on task abstraction can be traced back to the work of Jaques
(1996, 2016). Stratified Systems Theory states that organisations
have multiple levels, or strata, based on the time span of control
(Table 1). Time span of control is a measurement of ‘the target
completion time of the longest task, project, or program assigned
to that role’ (Jaques 1990). Jaques (1996) identified 7 strata
within an organisation:
·

front-line

·

first-line manager

·

unit manager

·

general manager

·

business unit president

·

vice president

·

chief executive officer.

Stratified Systems Theory is a robust means of evaluating
organisations and allows for comparisons between different
organisations (Craddock 2009). Therefore, this theory has
direct relevance to the lessons-learnt process in the emergency
services sector as disasters usually involve a multi-agency
response. For example, Jaques (2016) highlights how each
organisation’s stratum aligns with other orgaisation’s strata;
where indiviuals from one stratum may have responsibility for
the activities of members of another organisational stratum, but
with no line management authority.
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Table 1. Occupational stratum of work in organisations (Jaques
1996, 2002).

Stratum

Time span of
discretion

7

Role complexity

Role

20+ years

Extrapolative
development of
whole systems

CEO

6

10 to 20 years

Defining whole
systems

Executive
Vice
President

5

5 to 10 years

Shaping whole
systems

Business Unit
President

4

2 to 5 years

Transforming
systems

General
Manager

3

1 to 2 years

Task extrapolation

Unit
Manager

2

3 months to 1
year

Task definition

First-line
Manager

1

1 day to 3
months

Concrete shaping

Front-line
workers

Analysis
This study investigated lessons identified within the bushfirethreat environment across 4 external reviews of significant
bushfires that occurred in Australia between 1983 and 2018. The
study followed the iterative thematic analysis process outlined
by Braun and Clarke (2006). This method involved reviewing the
data, generating a code list and undertaking multiple rounds of
searching, extracting and reviewing themes. Selecting external
post-event reviews that were conducted by experts and included
a methodology section provided validity to the study as it
indicates that the data is credible (Leung 2015). The iterative
thematic analysis process and using multiple sources to extract
themes (triangulation process) also added to the reliability and
validity of the study (Creswell & Plano Clark 2018).

Stage 1: Compressing Jaques’s stratum of work
The Stratified Systems Theory was compressed to 3 levels of
operational, middle management and executive as detailed in
Table 2.
Table 2: Compressed stratum of works.

Jacques’s
strata

Compressed
strata

7 to 8

3. Strategic
executive

Strategic decision-makers (i.e.
senior leaders and government
ministers, develops policies,
allocates agency resources).

4 to 6

2. Tactical
middle
management

Operational decision-makers (i.e.
team/section leaders, implement
policy, allocates tactical/daily
resources).

1 to 3

1. Operational

Tactical-level decision-makers
(i.e. first responders, direct
interaction with the public).

Description

Methodology
This study applied a 2-stage design that, while acknowledging the
theoretical framing of Jaques’s work, compressed the stratum of
work to 3 levels. Using this revised stratum, significant bushfire
events in Australia were thematically analysed.

Stage 1: Compressing Jaques’s stratum of work
Jaques (1996) Stratified Systems Theory can be used to classify
organisational positions into 7 different strata. However, it is
difficult to consistently apply the full Stratified Systems Theory
model to every organisation as the reviews focused on the
bushfire incident rather than on the organisations. Therefore, the
Stratified Systems Theory needed to be compressed into 3 levels
that were grouped based on alignment to the generally used
strata designations of operational (front-line), tactical (middle
managers) and strategic (executives).

Stage 2: Thematic analysis
Table 3 presents the inclusion criteria for the published documents
of post-event reviews of Australian bushfires (Benoot et al. 2016,
Eburn & Dovers 2015).
Table 3: Inclusion criteria.

Stage 2: Content and thematic analysis

Review type

Availability

Methodology

The most appropriate method for addressing the research
questions involved purposeful sampling and thematic analysis
(Braun & Clarke 2006). As a methodological process, purposeful
sampling involves selecting participants, or relevant documents,
‘directly related to the central phenomenon or key concept being
explored in a study’ (Creswell & Plano Clark 2018, p.176). For this
study, purposive sampling enabled the selection of informationrich cases that represent the complex elements of lessons learnt
from bushfire emergencies, and specifically, investigating the link
between lessons and the stratum of work.

Royal Commission

Publicly
available

Publicly
available
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OR
Parliamentary Inquiry
OR
Inquiry under existing
legislation
OR
Independent Review
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Using this process, 4 reviews of significant bushfire incidents
were selected:

reference the 1983 Ash Wednesday review that related to the
same geographic area.

·

1983 Ash Wednesday bushfire review (Miller, Carter &
Stephens 1984)

·

2009 Victorian bushfire review (Teague et al. 2010)

·

2011 Margaret River bushfire review (Keelty 2012)

·

2018 Bega Valley bushfire review (Keelty 2018).

The review included the 4 phases of the emergency management
cycle. The report did not use the specific terminology of
‘organisational strata’ but did consider organisational-level
change and had specific recommendations for senior executives.
For example, the review recommended appointing a full-time fire
commissioner, increasing prescribed burning and that ‘Victoria’s
ageing electricity infrastructure requires updating’ (Teague et
al. 2010, p.12). There were lessons identified that related to
information flow and information management. This information
lessons included having more nuanced bushfire warnings and
more specific information to operational firefighters. The lesson
about the nuanced bushfire warning can be aligned to the middle
management strata that prepares the community education
programs and the operational strata that provides advice to the
public.

The 4 reviewed documents totalled 399 pages, which were coded
for analysis. A code list was developed and refined throughout an
iterative coding process so that analysis of each document was
consistent. Each code related to a specific type of lesson. Lessons
were defined as a specific finding and/or recommendation that
can be actioned in the future (either to repeat in the future
or change in the future). As each lesson was extracted, it was
mapped against the established compressed stratum of work.

1983 Ash Wednesday bushfire review
On 16 February 1983, 180 bushfires were burning across Victoria.
These fires had a catastrophic impact on the communities
affected with 47 people killed, 2080 homes damaged or
destroyed and approximately 200,000 hectares burnt (Miller et
al. 1984, p.23). The subsequent review covered all phases of the
emergency management cycle. Although the review did not use
the specific terminology of ‘organisational strata’, there were
statements about the importance of senior and experienced
officers helping junior officers and how decisions were delegated
from the state-level Country Fire Authority to regional (local)
levels. Another key lesson, which primarily aligns to the executive
and operational strata, was that legislation, policies and
procedures should be enhanced to prepare, prevent and respond
to bushfire hazards and to recovery from bushfire incidents. For
example, the review stated that ‘suitable legislation would enable
the State Government to declare a “State of Emergency” or
“State of Disaster”…’ (Miller et al. 1984, p.63).
The review added that the Country Fire Authority and Forests
Commission Victoria should not be merged into one organisation
and should not adopt a common communications system.
Instead, the focus should be increased liaison and coordination.
The review’s emphasis on communication and coordination
included agencies that are not primarily focused on disaster
situations and members of the public. Although these lessons
are largely aligned to the executive strata (those responsible
for establishing and shaping organisational culture), there are
relevant lessons for the middle management and operational
strata that conduct the liaison activities.

2009 Victorian bushfire review
On 7 February 2009 (Black Saturday), over 300 bushfires
burned in Victoria. 173 people died and an estimated $4 billion
in damage occurred (Teague et al. 2010). Unlike the other
reviews, the review into these fires was established as a Royal
Commission. Although the commission’s final report referred to
other inquiries, including the 1998 Linton Inquiry that reviewed
incidents relating to the death of 5 firefighters, the report did not

2011 Margaret River bushfire review
The 2011 Margaret River bushfires in Western Australia started
when 2 prescribed burns became uncontrolled. They resulted
in 139 people being displaced; 32 homes, 9 chalets and 4 sheds
being destroyed and 3400 hectares burnt (Keelty 2012). The
primary focus of the review was to analyse how the Western
Australia Department of Environment and Conservation planned
and managed the 2 prescribed burns. The review did not
specifically refer to different strata within the department but
did use terms such as ‘middle management’.
The review covered 3 phases of the emergency management
cycle: prevention, preparedness and response. The review
referred to other reviews including the 2010 Ferguson Review
(Ferguson 2010), which focused on the department’s ability to
manage fires and a Western Australia Supreme Court decision
about prescribed burning. A key lesson in the review was
that managing the risks of prescribed burns, especially in the
rural-urban fringe, is complicated because not conducting
prescribed burns can lead to catastrophic situations if a bushfire
occurs. Although aspects of these lessons can be aligned to the
operational strata, which includes the individuals and teams who
conduct prescribed burns, the middle management stratum was
specifically mentioned. There are also lessons that can be aligned
to the executive strata that is responsible for setting the risk
assessment process, which was considered by the review to be
out-of-date and inconsistently applied.

2018 Bega Valley bushfire review
On 18 March 2018, multiple bushfires destroyed 65 homes, 70
caravans and cabins and 1250 hectares in the Bega Valley in New
South Wales. The review focused on one phase of the emergency
management cycle: response. The review assessed the
relationship between Fire and Rescue New South Wales (FRNSW)
and the Rural Fire Service (RFS). For example, the review stated
there was cooperation at the operational and executive strata
but ‘the weight of submissions painted a picture of animosity
and mistrust between FRNSW and the RFS in many districts and
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at the middle management level’ (Keelty 2018, p.18). The review
also highlighted that call-and-dispatch arrangements between
a 000 caller, RFS and the RFS were flawed and in need of urgent
reform. Aspects of this lesson are aligned to the executive
strata (by prioritising and funding resources for improving the
system) and the middle management strata (by implementing the
recommendations to improve the system).

Extracting themes
Once the full set of lessons were extracted, they were grouped
into themes (Table 4). A theme included extracted lessons that
were identified in 3 or more reviews. These themes included

the need to update legislation, procedures and documents so
that the emergency services organisations can adapt to different
bushfire conditions, environments and circumstances. There was
also emphasis on control and coordination within and between
emergency services organisations. This control and coordination
included role clarification and improving community education
and bushfire warnings processes. Several of the themes are
directly relevant to the national themes detailed in the Lessons
Management Handbook (Australian Institute for Disaster
Resilience 2019). Each theme was then mapped against the
relevant emergency management phase and the relevant
(indicative) strata (Table 5).

Table 4: Extracted themes.

Reviews of Australian bushfires
Lesson category

Specific lesson

Relevant fire factor

Ash
Wednesday
1983

Victorian
Bushfire
Review 2009

Margaret
River 2011

Bega Valley
2018

Weather conditions

yes

yes

yes

no

Fuel load

yes

yes

yes

no

Legislation and/or policies are out-of-date
and/or difficult to implement

yes

yes

yes

yes

Increase the number of prescribed burns

yes

yes

yes

no

Change building codes, planning and/or zoning
to reflect bushfire risk

yes

yes

yes

no

Update documents (i.e. disaster plans and
incident action plans)

yes

yes

yes

no

Problems shifting between non-disaster and
disaster roles

yes

yes

yes

no

Inconsistent processes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Liaison between agencies needs to improve

yes

yes

yes

yes

Need for role clarification

yes

yes

no

yes

Communication

Warnings/information system needs to
improve

yes

yes

yes

no

Resources,
equipment and
systems

Importance of volunteers and local knowledge

yes

yes

yes

yes

Communications and/or IT equipment

yes

yes

no

yes

Future threat

Future threat from bushfires

yes

yes

yes

yes

Recommends
updating legislation
and procedures

Coordination
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Table 5: Sample of extracted themes mapping against the emergency management phase and indicative strata.

Lesson category

Specific lesson

Phase

Indicative strata

Recommends updating
legislation, procedures

Increase the
number of
prescribed burns

Prevention

Executive: Responsible for updating legislation, procedures and
the overarching suite of documents; sets priorities and policies for
prescribed burns; setting organisational culture (ongoing emphasis
on officer safety).
Middle management: Responsible for the operational risks
for each prescribed burn; applying rating/prioritisation system
consistently; allocating resources
Operational: Conduct additional prescribed burns; using
equipment; following procedures.

Communication

Warnings/
information
system needs to
improve

Prepare and
Respond

Executive: Prioritise standardising IT systems; fund updated IT and
communication systems.
Middle management: Standardise (as much as possible) briefing
processes and information flows to/from the tactical teams;
regional level middle management to develop region-specific
advice for the public.
Operational: Provide specific advice to community groups using
different formats/platforms.

Coordination

Liaison between
agencies needs to
improve

Plan, prepare,
respond,
recovery

Executive: Responsible for establishing an organisational culture
that focuses on liaison; creating and enforcing standards.
Middle management: Responsible for liaison at the middle
management level and ensuring operational-level liaison occurs;
role clarification at team level.
Operational: Liaison at the operational level.

Resources, equipment
and systems

Importance of
volunteers and
local knowledge

Plan, prepare,
respond,
recovery

Do emergency services lessons occur
across the stratum?
Findings from this research supported the proposition made
in the research question by finding that lessons learnt can
be aligned to specific organisational strata. Findings can be
supported through the need for specific stratum learning in
legislation, communications, coordination and resourcing. For
example, the 2009 Victorian bushfire review recommended:

…the Country Fire Authority and the Department of
Sustainability and Environment standardise their operating
systems and information and communications technologies
with the aim of achieving greater efficiency and
interoperability between agencies.
(Teague et al. 2010, p.28).
This study also found that at the executive strata there is
a responsibility to establish an organisational culture that
focuses on intra- and inter-departmental liaison. Whereas, at
the middle management strata, the indicative focus is towards

Middle management: Problems in communication and information
sharing between the government agency and volunteer brigades.

standardising processes. Finally, at the operational strata,
liaison needs to be enabled and supported. Further research
could consider whether there are specific barriers at different
operational strata that impede the lessons-learnt process in
emergency services organisations. Improving lessons-learnt
processes could have flow-on implications for communities
through better responses to emergency incidents and for
government through improved use of resources.

Limitations
A limitation of this study was the difficulty in comparing the
selected incidents using only the external reviews as sources.
The reviews ranged in scale, with the 1983 and 2009 reviews
focusing on all 4 phases of the emergency management cycle,
while the other 2 reviews were narrower in scope. Apart from
the 2 Victorian incidents, the other incidents occurred in
different Australian states and involved different jurisdictions
and different emergency services organisations. Therefore, it
was difficult to assess whether a 2011 review into prescribed
bushfires getting out of control in Western Australia should have
learnt from a 1983 review into bushfires in Victoria.
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Conclusion
This study supported the proposition that emergency services
organisations need to continually improve and that some
learning between significant bushfire incidents occurs. However,
reviews undertaken following significant bushfire events still
indicate that further work is required. Furthermore, that lessons
learnt are implicitly aligned towards specific stratum. Therefore,
to assist the lessons-learnt process would be to align lessons to
specific organisational strata, as this provides clearer advice to
the organisations about who should be responsible for learning
from each identified lesson.

References
Aubry M & Lavoie-Tremblay M 2018, Rethinking organizational
design for managing multiple projects, International Journal of
Project Management, vol. 36, no. 3, pp.12–26.
Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience 2019, Lessons
Management Handbook (2nd ed). At: https://knowledge.aidr.org.
au/resources/lessons-management-handbook/ [19 October 2020].
Australian Law Reform Commission 2010, Royal Commissions and
official inquiries. At: www.alrc.gov.au/inquiry/royal-commissionsand-official-inquiries/ [1 March 2020].
Benoot C, Hannes K & Bilsen J 2016, The use of purposeful
sampling in a qualitative evidence synthesis: A worked example on
sexual adjustment to a cancer trajectory, BMC Medical Research
Methodology, vol. 16, no. 1, pp.16–21. doi:10.1186/s12874-0160114-6
Boin A & t'Hart P 2010, Organising for Effective Emergency
Management: Lessons from Research, Australian Journal of Public
Administration, vol. 69, no. 4, pp.357–371. doi:10.1111/j.14678500.2010.00694.x
Braun V & Clarke V 2006, Using thematic analysis in psychology,
Qualitative Research in Psychology, vol. 3, no. 2, pp.77–101.
Cameron PA, Mitra B, Fitzgerald M, Scheinkestel CD, Stripp A,
Batey C, Niggemeyer L, Truesdale M, Holman P, Mehra R, Wasiak
J & Cleland H 2009, Black Saturday: the immediate impact of the
February 2009 bushfires in Victoria, Australia, Medical Journal
of Australia, vol. 191, pp.11–16. doi:10.5694/j.1326-5377.2009.
tb02666.x
Cole L, Dovers S, Gough M & Eburn M 2018, Can major postevent inquiries and reviews contribute to lessons management?
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 33, no. 2,
pp.34–39.
Craddock K 2009, Requisite Organization Annotated Bibliography:
An Annotated Research Bibliography on Elliott Jaques (5th ed):
Part 1. At: http://dmcodyssey.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/
RO-Intro.pdf [12 February 2020].
Creswell JW & Plano Clark VL 2018, Designing and conducting
mixed methods research, 3rd edn, SAGE Publications Inc,
Thousand Oaks, California.

32

© 2021 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience

CSIRO & Bureau of Meteorology 2018, State of the Climate
2018, Bureau of Meteorology. At: www.bom.gov.au/state-of-theclimate/State-of-the-Climate-2018.pdf [14 March 2020].
Deverell E 2009, Crises as Learning Triggers: Exploring a
Conceptual Framework of Crisis-Induced Learning, Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management, vol. 17, no. 3, pp.179–188.
Donahue A & Tuohy R 2006, Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study
of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We
Can Learn Them, Homeland Security Affairs. At: www.hsaj.org/
articles/167 [21 October 2020].
Duffield S & Whitty SJ 2015, Developing a systemic lessons
learned knowledge model for organisational learning through
projects, International Journal of Project Management, vol. 33,
no. 2, pp.311–324.
Dufty N 2013, Evaluating emergency management after an
event: gaps and suggestions, Australian Journal of Emergency
Management, vol. 28, no. 4, pp.15–19.
Eburn M & Dovers S 2015, Learning Lessons from Disasters:
Alternatives to Royal Commissions and Other Quasi-Judicial
Inquiries, Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 74,
no. 4, pp.495–508. doi:10.1111/1467-8500.12115
Ferguson E 2010, A Review of the Ability of the Department
of Environment and Conservation Western Australia to
Manage Major Fires. At: https://library.dbca.wa.gov.au/static/
FullTextFiles/628453.pdf.
Garvin DA, Edmondson AC & Gino F 2008, Tool Kit: Is Yours a
Learning Organization?, Harvard Business Review. At: https://hbr.
org/2008/03/is-yours-a-learning-organization [20 October 2020 ].
Glassey S 2015, Opinion: Preventing ‘lessons lost’: is evidencebased dynamic doctrine the answer? Australian Journal of
Emergency Management, vol. 30, no.3, pp.11–14.
Howes M, Tangney P, Reis K, Grant-Smith D, Heazle M,
Bosomworth K & Burton P 2015, Towards networked governance:
improving interagency communication and collaboration for
disaster risk management and climate change adaptation in
Australia, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management,
vol. 58, no. 5, pp.757–776.
Jackson LM 2016, The influence of organisational culture on
learning lessons: implementing a lessons management life cycle,
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 31, no. 1,
pp.18–23.
Jaques E 1990, In Praise of Hierarchy, Harvard Business Review,
vol. 1990, no. January-February. At: https://hbr.org/1990/01/inpraise-of-hierarchy [14 March 2020].
Jaques E 1996, Requisite Organization: A Total System for Effective
Managerial Organization and Managerial Leadership for the 21st
Century, 2nd edn, Carson Hall & Co, Arlington, Virginia.
Jaques E 2016, Requisite Organization: A Total System for Effective
Managerial Organization and Managerial Leadership for the 21st
Century, Revised 2nd edn, Routledge, London.

RESEARCH

Jaques E 2002, The Life and Behavior of Living Organisms A
General Theory, Praeger Publishers, Westport.
Keelty MJ 2012, Appreciating the Risk: Report of the Special
Inquiry into the November 2011 Margaret River Bushfire, Western
Australia Public Sector Commission. At: https://publicsector.
wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/inquiry _-_margaret_
river_bushfire_-_report_-_appreciating _the_risk_with_
annexures.pdf.
Keelty MJ 2018, Bega Valley Fires Independent Review, Resilience
NSW, www.emergency.nsw.gov.au/Documents/publications/
Bega-Valley-Fire-Independent-Review.PDF.
Leonard HB & Howitt AM 2010, Organising Response to Extreme
Emergencies: The Victorian Bushfires of 2009, Australian Journal
of Public Administration, vol. 69, pp.372–386.
Leung L 2015, Validity, reliability, and generalizability in
qualitative research, Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care,
vol. 4, no. 3, pp.324–327. doi:10.4103/2249-4863.161306
McAneney J, Chen K & Pitman A 2009, 100-years of Australian
bushfire property losses: Is the risk significant and is it increasing?’
Journal of Environmental Management, vol. 90, no. 8,
pp.2819–22.
McCaw WL 2013, Managing forest fuels using prescribed fire
- A perspective from southern Australia, Forest Ecology and
Management, vol. 294, pp.217–224.

Winkworth G, Healy C, Woodward M & Camilleri P 2009,
Community capacity building: Learning from the 2003 Canberra
bushfires, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 24,
no. 2, pp.5–12.

About the authors
Jennifer Medbury lectures in intelligence and terrorism
studies at Edith Cowan University. She has over 11
years’ experience as an intelligence analyst and senior
intelligence analyst with the Australian Defence
Intelligence Organisation and the Western Australia Police
Force.
Dr David Brooks is the Associate Professor in Security
Science at Edith Cowan University. His interests are in
the security science body of knowledge, security system
design and evaluation.
Michael Coole is a senior lecturer and researcher at
Edith Cowan University. He has 25 years’ experience
in the security and emergency management fields and
has worked in the Australian Defence Force, Western
Australia’s Department of Corrective Services and as a
private security consultant.

Miller SI, Carter W & Stephens RG 1984, Report of the bushfire
review committee on bushfire disaster preparedness and response
in Victoria, Australia, following the Ash Wednesday Fires 16
February 1983, State Library of Victoria. At: http://search.slv.vic.
gov.au/permalink/f/1cl35st/SLV_VOYAGER74639.
Owen C, Brooks B, Curnin S & Bearman C 2018, Enhancing
Learning in Emergency Services Organisational Work, Australian
Journal of Public Administration, vol. 77, no. 4, pp.715–728.
doi:10.1111/1467-8500.12309
Rowe SF & Sikes S 2006, Lessons learned: taking it to the next
level’ PMI® Global Congress 2006 North America, Seattle. At:
www.pmi.org/learning/library/lessons-learned-next-levelcommunicating-7991.
Stuart H & Thomason M 2018, Case study: lessons management
capability in emergency management and beyond, Australian
Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 33, no. 2, pp.16–17.
Teague B, McLeod R & Pascoe S 2010, 2009 Victorian Bushfires
Royal Commission Final Report: Summary, Victoria Government.
At: http://royalcommission.vic.gov.au/finaldocuments/summary/
PF/VBRC_Summary _PF.pdf .
Valent P 1984, The Ash Wednesday bushfires in Victoria, Medical
Journal of Australia, vol. 141, pp.291–300.
Whitmer DE, LaGoy MR & Sims VK 2018, Understanding
emergency response: lessons learned from the helping literature,
International Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 14, no. 1,
pp.23–39. doi:10.1504/IJEM.2018.089187

Australian Journal of Emergency Management

Volume 36

No. 2

April 2021

33

